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P = 0.9, then the probability that we are Sims is indeed high (= 0.81). So
then we would be reasonable in believing that we are Sims. But in the
absence of any reason to assign P such a high probability, it is reasonable
to continue believing that we are not Sims.
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Coherentism and the symmetry of epistemic
support
Nicholas Shackel
In a recent paper Tom Stoneham (2007) offered a reductio of coherentism.
In this paper I defend Stoneham from a criticism made by Darrell
Rowbottom (2007) and I offer two proofs. The first is of an early step in
Stoneham’s argument, a step which is not (in my opinion) adequately
argued by Stoneham; the second is that holistic coherentism is logically
equivalent to the symmetry and quasi-transitivity1 of epistemic support
and a condition on justified beliefs. I rebut Rowbottom partly because my
proof uses the premiss he is criticising. I offer the proofs because I think the
results are a matter of independent interest. For example, Thagard (2000)
takes symmetry as an axiom, but perhaps he need not, or perhaps it,
together with his view of explanation, commits him to holism. My proofs
are independent of the criticisms of Stoneham made by Christoph Jäger
(2007) and Paul Noordhof (2007).
Stoneham’s first premiss is his characterization of coherentism:
(1) There are finite sets of beliefs such that each member of the set is
epistemically supported by some other members (and nothing
else). (Coherentism) (2007: 254)
1 I stipulate that ‘L is quasi-transitive’ means that "x"y"z(x  z ∧ Lxy ∧ Lyz → Lxz).
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Later, Stoneham suggests that the negation of (1) is ‘a pretty good definition
of foundationalism’ (2007: 257). Rowbottom thinks (1) cannot character-
ize coherentism because it can be shown to be true independently of
coherentism. Rowbottom proposes a thought experiment in which a sub-
ject’s memories are erased and replaced with three beliefs which apparently
support one another (contents: ‘there is a unicorn’; ‘there is a white un-
icorn’; ‘all unicorns are white’). Rowbottom’s argument is essentially this:
(A) the brainwashed subject’s beliefs are each epistemically sup-
ported by his two other beliefs and nothing else.
(B) A is true independently of whether foundationalism or coherent-
ism is true.
(C) Therefore there are finite sets of beliefs such that each member of
the set is epistemically supported by some other members (and
nothing else). (A, Existential generalization)
(D) Therefore (1) is true independently of whether foundationalism
or coherentism is true. (A, B, C)
(E) Therefore (1) does not characterize coherentism. (D)
So if Rowbottom is right, coherentism cannot be refuted by a reductio of
(1).
1. Rebutting Rowbottom
Rowbottom appeals directly to our intuitive understanding of epistemic
support. The claimed epistemic support among the trio of beliefs is con-
stituted by relations between their contents and nothing else: two entail-
ments and one instance of weak inductive support.2 This seems plausible,
but the fact that it is controversial whether known entailment is sufficient
for the transmission of warrant or knowledge3 shows that it cannot be
assumed that epistemic relations follow entailments.
To advance on this I think we need to look carefully at the definition of
epistemic support offered by Stoneham:
Epistemic support: ‘A belief b(p) is epistemically supported by the
belief b(q) iff b(p)’s justifiedness or reasonableness (for a subject at a
time) consists in part in b(p) standing in some relation of dependence
to b(q).’ (2007: 254)
2 Rowbottom also mentions even simpler examples, such as {s, r, s ∧ r}, where the
putative epistemic support is all entailment.
3 For example, Dretske’s (1970) example of having a visual warrant for believing that
an animal is a zebra and knowing that if it is a zebra it is not a disguised mule whilst
not having a warrant for believing that it is not a cleverly disguised mule (and hence
not knowing that it is not). For a recent view on the controversy see Silins 2005.
coherentism and the symmetry of epistemic support 227
09
I think Stoneham is right to relate epistemic support to justification and
dependence.4 A justified belief is one that depends in the right way on a
sufficiency of epistemic support of the right sort. Rowbottom stipulates
that the beliefs in his example ‘are not justified ... except insofar as they
might cohere’ (2007: 345) but evidently does not think that that might
cause any problems for the claimed epistemic support. I think that being
persuaded by Rowbottom’s case requires us to underplay the relations
between epistemic support, justification and dependence.
Looking at the right-hand side of Stoneham’s definition of epistemic
support, we see a condition that is a conjunction: that b(p) is justified and
its justifiedness depends on b(q). Under this definition, then, unjustified
beliefs cannot be epistemically supported. That sounds wrong. There is a
temptation to think that the epistemic support between a belief and an
entailing belief can be sturdy even if the first belief is unjustified. On the
other hand, it also sounds wrong to say that a belief lacking any justifi-
cation nevertheless has strong epistemic support, just because enough
epistemic support can constitute justification.
I think we can resolve these conflicts by distinguishing the variable and
threshold concepts of justification and distinguishing conditional justifica-
tion from justification (which latter I shall call absolute justification when
needing to draw particular attention to this distinction). There are corre-
late concepts of epistemic support. The degree of justification varies with
the strength and extent of epistemic support. The conditionality of the
epistemic support tracks the conditionality of justification. Completely
unjustified beliefs are not epistemically supported by anything because if a
belief has some epistemic support then it at least has some minimal degree
of justification. It is possible for a belief to give strong conditional
epistemic support to another even when the second lacks absolute justifi-
cation. And so on.
My suggestion is that we have to disambiguate the definition of
epistemic support and insist that the correlate concepts of epistemic
support and justification be used on both sides of the biconditional. Doing
so makes it clear that Stoneham could reasonably insist that (1) charac-
terizes coherentism in either of two ways: when epistemic support is
defined in terms of threshold justification; alternatively, when epistemic
support is defined in terms of absolute justification, when the correlate
concept of epistemic support is absolute, not conditional.
With these thoughts in mind I think we can see why Rowbottom’s
examples appeal and why they fail. They appeal because we take the
4 Stoneham’s definition also mentions reasonableness. Since what I shall say about
justifiedness can be said equally of reasonableness I shall not discuss reasonableness
explicitly. Alternatively, we could strike ‘reasonableness’ from the definition.
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coherence got from the entailments and inductive support to provide a
weak degree of justification and so we grant that those entailments and
inductive support amount to epistemic support. Because entailment is a
strong logical relation we take the presence of epistemic support to be
undeniable. They fail either because the beliefs are threshold unjustified
(thus undermining premiss A) or because foundationalism and coherent-
ism do not agree on the cases (undermining premiss B) or because the
epistemic support is conditional (either undermining premiss A or making
the step to C invalid by equivocation). I now spell this out.
Under the threshold concept of justification
Rowbottom’s stipulation that the beliefs ‘are not justified in an internal or
external sense, except in so far as they might cohere’ (2007: 345) is not
innocent. It is necessary for the examples to satisfy the ‘nothing else’ clause
of (1). Under foundationalism, however, the mere coherence of a belief
with ungrounded or unjustified beliefs cannot result in the belief passing
the threshold for justification.
In Rowbottom’s trio, the support offered for the belief that all unicorns
are white is inductive support given by the belief that there is a white
unicorn. Under coherentism, it is not justified for two reasons. The first is
that in doesn’t pass the threshold for coherence by enumerative induction.
Secondly, most varieties of coherentism apply some maximality condition
on the set of beliefs with which a belief coheres, and three beliefs is just too
small a number for any of the set to be coherence justified (a point which
applies to all his examples).
So whether coherentism or foundationalism is true, none of the beliefs in
his examples are threshold justified, and so there is no epistemic support
between them when it is defined in terms of threshold justification.
It is tempting to think that this could be got round by a strengthened
example, such as by adding the belief that every member of a non-empty
representative sample of unicorns is white.5 If that belief is to get us past
the threshold for justification it may also be necessary to add beliefs about
the epistemic significance of such samples for inductive inference, or more
general beliefs about methodology and the norms of inductive inference.
Alternatively, it might be thought that I’ve loaded the example against
Rowbottom by picking on such a normatively weighty belief needed only
by internalists, and that the better strengthening in his aid is to supply the
subject with lots of 1st order beliefs that might suffice for externalist
inductive justification. We should give him a hundred or a thousand or a
5 My thanks to Michael Clark for raising this possibility.
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million beliefs with the contents ‘a is a white unicorn’, ‘b is a white
unicorn’, and so on.
In either of these cases we have a proposed base for an inductive
justification that all unicorns are white. Does the justification pass the
threshold? Usually this kind of induction passes the threshold only in the
context of or against a background of a great many other beliefs, and it is
in such contexts that we usually make such inferences. So a coherentist
can plausibly say that the inductive justification is absent otherwise. But
suppose a coherentist must grant justification in these cases. It remains the
case that a foundationalist cannot, for the reason already given – for him
coherence alone does not justify, but coherence is all that is had here. So
now foundationalism and coherentism do not agree on the cases.
Under the variable concept of justification
Suppose that in characterizing coherence (1) uses only the variable concept
of justification. The case is not going to run as it stands under internalism.
Our subject has only these three beliefs. Without additional beliefs in the
entailments and inductive support the beliefs do not provide any degree of
justification for each other. Externalists would be equally unhappy because
the beliefs depend on the brainwashing rather than each other and reliable
belief causing mechanisms. Dependence is also important in another
respect, namely, we might think that a possessed belief being part of a
potential justification for another is insufficient for epistemic support,
which requires the basing relation to be standing between the beliefs. Now
perhaps the internalist can stipulate knowledge of logic and the externalist
some clever brainwashing process which is a reliable belief-causing mecha-
nism such that each belief would not be had were the other two not had.
And perhaps both can stipulate ways in which the basing relation holds
between the beliefs. So suppose we set these problems aside. There is a
further reason that the cases fail.
The coherence between the beliefs to which Rowbottom is appealing
plays out differently for coherentists and foundationalists. Suppose a
coherentist must concede that they are to some small degree justified, and
so offer each other some degree of absolute epistemic support. A founda-
tionalist may not. For him, whilst the coherence constitutes some degree of
conditional justification, since there are no basic beliefs with some degree
of justification for that conditional justification to transmit to those beliefs,
the beliefs remain without any degree of justification. Hence by my insis-
tence that the correlate concepts of justification and epistemic support
appear in the definition, the beliefs provide no absolute epistemic support
for one another. So once again, foundationalism and coherentism disagree
on the cases.
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What about the conditional support? It is my contention that condi-
tional support, however strong, is not a sort of support, but merely a
promise of support. A beam in contact with the upper end of an immensely
strong pillar which is not itself supported receives no support from the
pillar, although it is true that if the pillar were supported then it would
support the beam. Consequently, in taking (1) to characterize coherence,
Stoneham could, and I think should, insist that the epistemic support is
absolute, not conditional.
2. Derivation of (1) from coherentism
So there are two ways in which epistemic support and justification could
be related without Stoneham’s characterization of coherentism being true
independently of coherentism. Furthermore, even if (1) is not adequate as
a definition of coherentism, it is an entailment of a fairly standard kind of
definition, together with the assumption that someone has got some jus-
tified beliefs. Hence the truth of coherentism can rise or fall with the truth
of (1). Coherentism is the view that
(i) only beliefs can justify a belief and
(ii) justification of a belief is coherence with a justifying coherent set
of beliefs to which the belief belongs.
What a justifying coherent set is depends on the theory of coherence and
whether we are speaking of the variable concept, when perhaps any
coherent set might count, or the threshold concept, when size and perhaps
content requirements may be in force.6 Then we have the version of
Stoneham’s definition of epistemic support which I recommend:
(iii) One belief epistemically supports another belief just in case the
latter is justified and its justification consists in part on its depen-
dence on the former.
Throughout our premisses, we read ‘justified’ and ‘justification’ in terms of
threshold justification or in terms of variable justification that is absolute,
giving us the correlate variety of epistemic support throughout.
(iv) Someone has got some justified beliefs.
(v) Therefore ‘(1): There are finite sets of beliefs such that each
member of the set is epistemically supported by some other
members (and nothing else)’.
6 We include varieties of coherentism in which the degree of coherence of a belief is
simply the coherence of the set of which it is a member, when all beliefs have the same
degree of coherence, and also varieties in which the degree of coherence of beliefs in
a coherent set can vary from belief to belief, depending both on the degree of
coherence of the set and on the nature and strength of their coherence with the set.
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3. Proof
We now proceed to the proofs that epistemic support is not asymmetric
and of the equivalence for holistic coherentism. First we need some defi-
nitions. A directed graph is an ordered pair of a set of vertices and a set of
directed edges, which latter are ordered pairs of members of the set of
vertices.7 A visual representation of a directed graph can be given by points
representing the vertices and arrows representing the directed edges. So for
example, if Vertices = {a, b, c, d} and Directed Edges = {〈a, b〉, 〈b, c〉, 〈c, a〉,
〈b, d〉}, then we could represent this by:
A directed cycle is a polygon of vertices joined by directed edges all
pointing in the same direction round the polygon (so our example contains
a directed cycle). A cyclic directed graph contains at least one directed
cycle.
Lemma: If every vertex in a finite directed graph has an incoming edge
then the graph is directed cyclic.
Proof: Suppose every vertex in a finite directed graph has an incoming
edge.8 Starting with any vertex we can take a ‘backwards’ walk along the
directed edges of as many steps as we please. Since there are only finitely
many vertices, after at most as many steps as there are vertices in the
graph, we must eventually return to a vertex we have already visited on the
walk. The path we walked backwards between the first and second visit to
that vertex is a directed cycle. Q.E.D.
Let S be a set of beliefs,9 E be the relation of epistemic support and R the
extension of E restricted to S. Then 〈S, R〉 is a directed graph, which we
shall call the epistemic support graph of S, in which S is the set of vertices
and R the set of directed edges. R is a set of ordered pairs of beliefs in S,
where an ordered pair is in R just in case the first belief epistemically
supports the second.
7 For definitions of paths, walks, connectedness, completeness, cycles, indegrees, etc.
see, for example, Bollobas 1998.
8 The indegree of every vertex  1.
9 Belief tokens, not types.
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Theorem 1: ‘(3) The relation of epistemic support is not asymmetric.’
(Stoneham 2007: 255).
Proof: We have as premisses (1) and the quasi-transitivity of epistemic
support.10 Let S be one of the sets of beliefs mentioned in (1). S is a finite
set and so 〈S, R〉 is a finite directed graph. (1) implies that every member
of S is epistemically supported by some other member of S; consequently
(since R is the extension of epistemic support restricted to S) every vertex
in 〈S, R〉 has an incoming edge in R and so by the lemma 〈S, R〉 is a cyclic
directed graph.
Now consider any distinct pair of vertices, {x, y}, in any directed cycle
in 〈S, R〉. There is a finite directed path in that cycle from x to y and
another from y to x. The quasi-transitivity of epistemic support implies the
quasi-transitivity of R. So by quasi-transitivity, there is a directed edge in
R from x to y and a directed edge in R from y to x. Since R is the extension
of E restricted to S, {x, y} is a pair of mutually supporting beliefs, and so
epistemic support is not asymmetric. Q.E.D.
Theorem 2: Coherentist justification is holistic if and only if epistemic
support is quasi-transitive and symmetric and the epistemic support graph
of any set of justified beliefs of a person is connected.11
Proof: Left to Right: Coherentist justification being holistic means that
the justification of a belief depends in part on all the beliefs in the justifying
coherent set to which it belongs. So every belief in a justifying coherent set
epistemically supports and is epistemically supported by all the other
beliefs. So any pair of beliefs in a justifying coherent set are mutually
supporting and hence epistemic support is symmetric and quasi-transitive.
It also follows that every ordered pair of beliefs in a justifying coherent set
belongs to the set of directed edges of its epistemic support graph, which
is consequently complete. As a result, since a set of justified beliefs of a
person is a subset of a justifying coherent set, the epistemic support graph
of a set of justified beliefs must be connected.
Right to Left: Consider any justifying coherent set of beliefs, JCB, the
subset, J, of all justified beliefs in JCB, and the subset, U, of beliefs that
play some part in justifying at least one member of J. If U is a proper subset
of JCB then there are beliefs in JCB which play no part whatsoever in the
justification of any belief in JCB. But that entails that they have no
coherence whatsoever with any belief in JCB, which is to say they belong
to JCB but are incoherent with JCB, contradicting its coherence. Hence
U = JCB. By the definition of U, each belief in JCB\J epistemically supports
10 ‘(2*) "x"y"z(x  z ∧ Lxy ∧ Lyz → Lxz)’ (Stoneham 2007: 255).
11 Note also that if epistemic support is quasi-transitive and symmetric then an
epistemic support graph is connected if and only if it is complete.
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at least one belief in J (vacuously true if JCB\J = ∅). So in conjunction with
the hypothesis that the epistemic support graph of J is connected it follows
that the epistemic support graph of JCB is connected. Also by hypothesis
epistemic support is symmetric and quasi-transitive. Consequently, every
member of JCB epistemically supports and is epistemically supported by
all the other beliefs. Hence the justification of every member of J depends
in part on all the beliefs in the justifying coherent set that it belongs to,
through which belonging it is justified, and so coherentist justification is
holistic. Q.E.D.
Cardiff University
Cardiff CF10 3EU, UK
shackeln@cardiff.ac.uk
References
Bollobas, B. 1998. Modern Graph Theory. New York: Springer.
Dretske, F. I. 1970. Epistemic operators. Journal of Philosophy 67: 1007–23.
Jäger, C. 2007. Is coherentism coherent? Analysis 67: 341–44.
Noordhof, P. 2007. A coherentist response to Stoneham’s reductio. Analysis 67:
267–68.
Rowbottom, D. P. 2007. A refutation of foundationalism. Analysis 67: 345–46.
Silins, N. 2005. Transmission failure failure. Philosophical Studies 126: 71–102.
Stoneham, T. 2007. A reductio of coherentism. Analysis 67: 254–57.
Thagard, P. 2000. Coherence in Thought and Action. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Thoughts, oughts and the conceptual primacy
of belief
Alexander Miller
1. A concept is constitutively normative if grasping a statement involving
it requires grasping that the statement entails an ought or a may. In recent
work, Paul Boghossian (2003, 2005) has argued that the concept ofmental
content is constitutively normative. Boghossian’s argument for the norma-
tivity of mental content has two main parts. In the first part, Boghossian
argues that the concept of belief is a constitutively normative notion, in
that
(1) Marco understands that Ebeneezer believes that Mallory reached
the summit
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